When outsourcing data to third-party servers, searchable encryption is an important enabling technique which simultaneously allows the data owner to keep his data in encrypted form and the third-party servers to search in the ciphertexts. Motivated by an encrypted email retrieval and archive scenario, we investigate asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE) schemes which support two special features, namely message recovery and flexible search authorization. With this new primitive, a data owner can keep his data encrypted under his public key and assign different search privileges to third-party servers. In the security model, we define the standard IND-CCA security against any outside attacker and define adapted ciphertext indistinguishability properties against inside attackers according to their functionalities. Moreover, we take into account the potential information leakage from trapdoors, and define two trapdoor security properties. Employing the bilinear property of pairings and a deliberately-designed double encryption technique, we present a provably secure instantiation of the primitive based on the DLIN and BDH assumptions in the random oracle model.
INTRODUCTION
To protect outsourced data and services in the cloud computing environment, cryptographic researchers have devoted a lot of efforts to searchable encryption techniques. Such techniques are particularly interesting because they allow a data owner to encrypt his data and outsource the cipheretxts while still being able to let third-party service Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ASIA CCS '13 providers search on his behalf without leaking any unnecessary information. Roughly speaking, searchable encryption schemes fall into two categories. One category is symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) schemes, represented by the work of Song, Wagner, and Perrig [12] . In this category, only the data owner can contribute searchable contents. The other category is asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE) schemes, represented by the work of Boneh et al. [4] . In this category, the concept of public key encryption is employed so that every entity can contribute searchable contents. A detailed survey and analysis of existing searchable encryption (both SSE and ASE) schemes can be found in [13] .
Motivated by an encrypted email retrieval and archive scenario, as described below, we investigate ASE schemes which support two special features: message recovery and flexible search authorization. The message recovery feature requires that a ciphertext not only allows the data owner to recover the plaintext but also allows third-party servers to search in it. The flexible searchable authorization feature requires that the data owner can authorize a third-party server in three different ways: (1) authorize the server to search any message at the data owner's interest by assigning a message-dependent trapdoor (i.e. the server can only determine whether the message encoded in the trapdoor is equal to the plaintext inside a ciphertext); (2) authorize the server to search any message at the server's interests by assigning a master trapdoor (i.e. the server can choose a message at its will and see whether it is equal to the plaintext inside any ciphertext); (3) authorize the server to perform both types of searches. Throughout the paper, we refer to this new type of ASE schemes as ASE † † .
Encrypted Email Retrieval and Archive
Suppose that Bob is an employee of the company COM and emails sent to him are required to be encrypted and stored in an email server managed by COM. Suppose that Alice wants to send an email to Bob, then she can encrypt the email using Bob's public key and send the ciphertext to COM's email server. Note that, here, Bob is the owner of his emails. In practice, the underlying encryption scheme should satisfy the following requirements.
1. When Bob is traveling around, he may want to selectively retrieve and read his emails from COM's email server. Thus, the encryption scheme should allow the email server to search on Bob's behalf to identify those at his interests.
2. A malicious user can send Bob encrypted emails, which contain malwares or viruses. Thus, the encryption scheme should allow the email server to scan the encrypted emails to identify malicious contents.
3. Bob may change his job over the time, so that he may want to archive his emails during different jobs in a cloud server, such as Gmail. Bob can simply forward all his encrypted emails to the archive server. Later on, Bob may need to selectively retrieve some of the emails, therefore, the encryption scheme should allow the cloud server to search on Bob's behalf as in the first requirement.
With an ASE † † scheme, the message recovery feature guarantees that only Bob can decrypt the encrypted emails while he can still authorize the servers to search on his behalf. The flexible search authorization feature allows Bob to assign a master trapdoor to COM's email server so that the latter can scan malicious contents inside the encrypted emails, and this feature also allows Bob to assign message-dependent trapdoors to COM's email server and the cloud server to search emails at his interests.
Related Work
As surveyed in [13] , the majority of existing ASE schemes are index-based, which means that they only aim at supporting search over scrambled keywords and typically do not allow the data owner to recover the keywords. By definition, these schemes do not allow the servers to search directly over the contents, therefore their functionality is far from what an ASE † † scheme is aimed for. On the other hand, an ASE † † scheme fulfills the purpose of these index-based ASE schemes.
Fuhr and Paillier [7] and Hofheinz and Weinreb [8] investigated the concept of ASE with message recovery. Their formulations only allow the data owner to assign messagedependent trapdoors to third-party servers, thus provide less functionality than ASE † † . As to the security models, the authors only consider information leakage from ciphertexts and allow the servers to easily recover the information encoded in the trapdoors. In [7] , if a match is found then the server immediately knows the plaintext in the ciphertext, while, in [8] , the to-be-searched message is sent to the server in plaintext. In practice, this may be regarded as a serious security weakness.
Ibraimi et al. [9] pushed forward the concept of ASE with message recovery and proposed a new primitive PKEDS, namely public key encryption with delegated search. With a PKEDS scheme, a data owner can authorize third-party servers in two ways: (1) authorize a server to search any message at the server's interests by assigning a master trapdoor; (2) authorize a server to search messages at the data owner's interests by assigning message-dependent trapdoors. In their formulation, authorization (2) implies authorization (1), because search based on message-dependent trapdoors also requires a master trapdoor as input. In other words, the data owner must assign a master trapdoor to a server in order to ask the latter to perform any search. This fact conflicts with the least privilege principle in information security and is undesirable. For instance, in the aforementioned application scenario, Bob may not want to assign a master trapdoor to the cloud server to let the latter probe all his emails.
Recently, Tang et al. in [14] refined PKEDS and proposed a primitive similar to ASE † † . However, in their security model, only IND-CPA security is considered and the notion of soundness is also weaker than that in this paper.
Contribution
In this paper, we formulate a new primitive, namely ASE † † . With an ASE † † scheme, the data owner can keep data in encrypted form while still be able to recover the plaintext and authorize third-party servers to search on his behalf. The authorization to a server is through assigning the appropriate trapdoors: message-dependent trapdoors, master trapdoors, or both types of trapdoors. In contrast to [9] , a search based on a message-dependent trapdoor does not require a master trapdoor as input, and this implies a significant security improvement. In practice, the data owner can authorize different servers based on their trustworthiness.
With respect to the functionality of ASE † † , we provide a comprehensive definition for the soundness property. The property guarantees that not only the encryption/decryption algorithms work well but also the decryption and the test algorithms are bilaterally consistent with each other. We present a fine-grained security model by considering four categories of attackers, including an outside attacker and three types of curious servers based on the trapdoors they receive. We define the standard IND-CCA security against an outside attacker, and define adapted ciphertext indistinguishability security properties against the curious servers. Moreover, we define two trapdoor security properties to model the possible information leakages from message-dependent trapdoors. This security model is stronger than that in [14] .
The soundness property turns out to be very difficult to be satisfied. Hybrid constructions (e.g. [1, 16] ) and other constructions (e.g. [14] ) do not satisfy this property. Based on bilinear pairing techniques and a deliberately-designed double encryption technique, we propose a new ASE † † scheme and prove its security based on DLIN and BDH assumptions in the random oracle model.
Organization
In Section 2, we formulate the concept of ASE † † and define the soundness property. In Section 3, we present a finegrained security model for ASE † † . In Section 4, we present an IND-CCA secure scheme and analyse its security. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
DEFINITION OF ASE † †
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation. x||y means the concatenation of x and y, P.P.T. means probabilistic polynomial time, x ∈R X means that the element x is chosen from the set X uniformly at random, and x $ ← A(m1, m2, · · · ; O1, O2, · · · ) means that x is the output of the algorithm A which runs with the input m1, m2, · · · and access to the oracles O1, O2, · · · .
Primitive Formulation
In general, an ASE † † scheme involves the following entities. In each server category, there can be multiple servers, but we only consider one for the simplicity of description.
• A data owner, who is supposed to receive encrypted messages. This entity is also referred to as receiver in encryption schemes.
• Type-I server S1, which receives message-dependent trapdoors from the data owner. It can test whether the message encoded in a trapdoor is equal to the plaintext inside any given ciphertext.
• Type-II server S2, which receives a master trapdoor from the data owner. It can choose a message at its will and test whether it is equal to the plaintext inside any given ciphertext.
• Hybrid server S h , which is both Type-I and Type-II.
• Senders, who may send messages to the data owner.
Let λ be the security parameter. Formally, an ASE † † scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• rKeyGen(λ): Run by the data owner, it outputs a public/private key pair (P Kr, SKr). Let the message space be denoted as W.
• Encrypt(w, P Kr) Run by a message sender, it outputs a ciphertext cw for a message w ∈ W.
• Decrypt(cw, SKr): Run by the data owner, it outputs the plaintext w or an error message ⊥.
• sKeyGen(λ): Run by a server (S1, S2, or S h ), it outputs a public/private key pair (P Ks, SKs)
• TrapGen 1 (w, P Ks, SKr): Run by the data owner, it generates a message-dependent trapdoor tw,s for the server with public key P Ks.
• Test1(cw, t w ′ ,s , SKs): Run by the server with messagedependent trapdoor t w ′ ,s and private key SKs, it returns 1 if w ′ = w and 0 otherwise.
• TrapGen 2 (P Ks, SKr): Run by the data owner, it outputs a master trapdoor t * ,s for the server with public key P Ks.
• Test2(cw, w ′ , t * ,s, SKs): Run by the server with the master trapdoor t * ,s and private key SKs, it returns 1 if w ′ = w and 0 otherwise.
Note that (rKeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) define a standard PKE scheme. As indicated in [4] , the trapdoors should be transmitted to the servers through a secure channel (with confidentiality), otherwise any attacker will be able to obtain the trapdoors and search over the ciphertexts. However, this issue has not been formally addressed in the primitive formulation and security model in [4] . Here, we explicitly provide the sKeyGen algorithm so that potential servers can run this algorithm to generate a key pair, with which the data owner can generate trapdoors in an encrypted form by running the TrapGen 1 and TrapGen 2 algorithms.
Soundness Property
Similar to the case for other primitives, the first property we want is soundness, defined as follows.
Definition 1. An ASE
† † scheme is sound if, for any (P Kr, SKr) = rKeyGen(λ) and (P Ks, SKs) = sKeyGen(λ), the following conditions are satisfied.
1. For any w ∈ W, Decrypt(Encrypt(w, P Kr), SKr) = w always holds. In the above definition, the first condition means that the encryption/decryption functionality works well. The second and the third conditions define the bilateral consistency property between the decryption and test algorithms.
The "if" condition guarantees that any matched ciphertext by the test algorithms can be successfully decrypted and the resulted plaintext will be equal to that assumed in the test algorithms. For instance, if a test algorithm indicates c is an encryption of w, then the decryption algorithm will not output w ′ = w or an error ⊥. Basically, this property guarantees that there is no "false positive" in the search process.
The "only if" condition guarantees that if a ciphertext can be successfully decrypted then the test algorithms should be able to properly match it. This property guarantees that no targeted ciphertext will be missed by the test algorithms. Take the encrypted email retrieval and archive scenario as example, this property is crucial for the email server not to miss any malicious contents in the encrypted emails.
THE SECURITY MODEL
We assume that the message senders possess a valid copy of the receiver's public key and the receiver possesses valid copies of the public keys of the servers. How to securely distribute these public keys should follow some standard practice, and we skip the discussion in this paper.
As to the security of an ASE † † scheme, there are two main privacy concerns.
• One concern is the leakage of plaintext information from ciphertexts, which is a standard concern for all encryption schemes. Given ciphertexts, an attacker can try to deduce information about the encrypted plaintexts. Particularly, for an ASE † † scheme, knowledge about the (un-encrypted) master trapdoors or message-dependent trapdoors will provide additional advantage to the attacker. Therefore, we will consider the following types of attackers.
-Outside attacker: This type of attacker is not assigned with any type of (unencrypted) trapdoors.
-Curious Type-I server S1: This type of attacker has been assigned with only message-dependent trapdoors generated under its public key.
-Curious Type-II server S2: This type of attacker has only been assigned with a master trapdoor generated under its public key.
-Curious hybrid server S h : This type of attacker has been assigned with a master trapdoor and message-dependent trapdoors generated under its public key.
It is clear that a hybrid server is more powerful than others. However, due to the fact that the data owner may employ all three types of servers, it is necessary to consider the maximal level of security against each of them independently.
• The other concern is information leakage from messagedependent trapdoors. For example, the Type-I server S1 receives message-dependent trapdoors so that it knows which ciphertext matches a received trapdoor. However, S1 should not know the message encoded in the trapdoor, or equivalently, S1
should not know what is the plaintext of the matched ciphertext. Furthermore, any entity other than S1 should not learn anything about the trapdoor. The same security requirement applies to a hybrid server S h because it also gets message-dependent trapdoors from the receiver.
To facilitate our security definitions, we first detail all the potential oracles accessible to an attacker. Based on our assumption that there is only one server of every type, so that each key generation oracle (sKeyGen 1 , sKeyGen 2 , sKeyGen h ) can only be queried once. Trivially, the key request oracles can only be queried after the corresponding key generation oracles have been queried.
• sKeyGen 1 : The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm to generate (P Ks 1 , SKs 1 ) for the Type-I server S1, and returns P Ks 1 .
• sKeyReq 1 : The challenger returns SKs 1 .
• sKeyGen 2 : The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm to generate (P Ks 2 , SKs 2 ) for the Type-II server S2, and returns P Ks 2 .
• sKeyReq 2 : The challenger returns SKs 2 .
• sKeyGen h : The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm to generate (P Ks h , SKs h ) for the hybrid server S h , and returns P Ks h .
• sKeyReq h : The challenger returns SKs h .
• TrapGen 1 query with a message w and P Ks as input: The challenger returns TrapGen 1 (w, P Ks, SKr). In this case s can be either s1 or s h
• TrapGen 2 query with a public key P Ks: The challenger returns TrapGen 2 (P Ks, SKr). In this case s can be either s2 or s h
• rKeyReq r : The challenger returns the receiver's private key SKr.
• Decrypt query with input c: The challenger returns Decrypt(c, SKr).
In the following, we present security definitions with respect to the aforementioned two types of privacy concerns.
Ciphertext Security Properties
Against an outside attacker, in Definition 2, we define an IND-CCA property similar to the IND-CCA security for PKE. Informally, the property says that, given some ciphertexts and various oracle accesses (including decryption oracle), an attacker cannot learn anything about the plaintexts. In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W and state is some state information generated by the attacker. In Phase 4, the attacker is not allowed to query the Decrypt oracle with cw b . In this game, an outside attacker is modeled since it is not
Figure 1: IND-CCA Security allowed to query any server's private key through sKeyReq 1 , sKeyReq 2 , or sKeyReq h . In practice, an outside attacker can eavesdrop on the transmission of (encrypted) trapdoors, so that we offer it access to both trapdoor generation oracles with its own inputs. Against a curious Type-I server S1, in Definition 3, we define a ciphertext indistinguishability (CI) security property similar to the security definition of PEKS [4] . Informally, this property says that, given some ciphertexts for which S1 has not obtained the corresponding message-dependent trapdoors, then it cannot learn anything about the plaintexts. 
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Kr, SKr) $ ← rKeyGen(λ) 2. (w0, w1, state) $ ← A(P Kr; sKeyGen 1 , sKeyGen 2 , sKeyGen h , TrapGen 1 , TrapGen 2 , sKeyReq 1 ) 3. b ∈R {0, 1}, cw b = Encrypt(w b , P Kr) 4. b ′ $ ← A(P Kr, state, cw b ; sKeyGen 1 , sKeyGen 2 , sKeyGen h , TrapGen 1 , TrapGen 2 , sKeyReq 1 )
Figure 2: CI Security against a Type-I Server
In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W and state is some state information generated by the attacker. In step 2 and 4, the TrapGen 1 oracle should have not been queried with (w0, P Ks 1 ) or (w1, P Ks 1 ). In this game, a Type-I server is modeled since the attacker is allowed to obtain SKs 1 through a sKeyReq 1 query, but has no access to SKs 2 or SKs h . The oracle access to message-dependent trapdoors for any messages except for w0 and w1 is indeed a big privilege for the attacker. Most existing IND-CPA secure PKE schemes, such as ElGamal [6] , normally allow some sort of homomorphism, so that they will not be secure if directly used in constructing an ASE † † scheme. As an example, it is easy to verify that the PKEDS scheme in [9] is not secure under this definition.
Against a curious hybrid server S h , we define a special CI security property. Compared with Definition 2 and Definition 3, the speciality lies in that the challenger randomly chooses the challenge messages w0, w1 instead of letting the attacker do. The rationale is that, for a curious hybrid server S h , if it can choose the messages then it can easily tell which message is encrypted by running the Test2 algorithm. 
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Kr, SKr) $ ← rKeyGen(λ) 2. state $ ← A(P Kr; sKeyGen 1 , sKeyGen 2 , sKeyGen h , TrapGen 1 , TrapGen 2 , sKeyReq h ) 3. b ∈R {0, 1}, w0, w1 ∈R W, c b = (Encrypt(w0, P Kr), Encrypt(w b , P Kr))4. b ′ $ ← A(P Kr, state, c b ; sKeyGen 1 , sKeyGen 2 , sKeyGen h , TrapGen 1 , TrapGen 2 , sKeyReq h )
Figure 3: CI Security against a Hybrid Server
In the attack game, state is some state information generated by the attacker. In this game, a hybrid server is modeled since the attacker is allowed to obtain SKs h through a sKeyReq h query, but has no access to SKs 1 or SKs 2 . This property guarantees that, given some ciphertexts, the attacker can neither recover the plaintexts nor find the equality relationship of the plaintexts. Therefore, it provides much stronger security guarantee than the standard one-wayness property used in [9] and the enhanced one-wayness property by Bellare, Boldyreva and O'Neill [2] .
Similarly, we can define a special CI security property against a curious Type-II server, as shown in Definition 5.
It is clear that if an ASE
† † scheme is secure under Definition 4 then it is also secure under Definition 5. 
Trapdoor Security Properties
In Definition 6, we define the universal trapdoor onewayness property. The property guarantees that no entity can recover the message encoded in a message-dependent trapdoor. Note that this will require the message space W not to be polynomial size. In the attack game, an outside attacker and various servers are modeled because the attacker can obtain the private keys (SKs 1 , SKs 2 , SKs h ) through the key request oracles (sKeyReq 1 , sKeyReq 2 , sKeyReq h ). Figure 4 . Note that the output value t in Phase 2 can be either 1, or 2, or h.
(P Kr
To further strengthen the universal trapdoor one-wayness property, in Definition 7, we define the message-dependent trapdoor indistinguishability property. Informally, the property guarantees that, for the Type-I server S1 or the hybrid server S h , no other entity can learn anything about the messages encoded in message-dependent trapdoors generated under its public key. In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W, the values t, t ′ are chosen (by the attacker) from {1, h} and t = t ′ , and state is some state information generated by the attacker. This guarantees that sKeyReq t is not queried in the game. We allow the attacker to request the receiver's private key in Phase 2 and all servers' private keys except for SKs t . It captures our intention that, even if the receiver's private key is leaked or compromised, then the attacker still cannot figure out what the receiver has searched for. This is similar to the forward secrecy property in key establishment protocols.
IND-CCA SECURE ASE † †
In this section, we first briefly mention some attempts, and then describe a novel ASE † † scheme and analyse its security properties in our security model.
Some Attempts
To construct an ASE † † scheme, a very natural direction is to follow the hybrid method used in [16] . Generically, the data owner can have two key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2), and the ciphertext of a message m is in the form of c = (c1, c2) = (Encrypt 1 (m, pk1), Encrypt 2 (m, pk2)), where c1 can be used for decryption and c2 can be used for search. With this methodology, the difficulty lies in that we need to provide a knowledge proof that c1 and c2 contain the same message in order to achieve the soundness property. Moreover, how to generate master trapdoors and message-dependent trapdoors is not a straightforward task either. It remains as an open problem to have a generic construction for ASE † † . Instead of a generic construction, we may follow the semihybrid method in [14] : use a standard PKE scheme as a main component and employ a key-private IBE scheme to facilitate trapdoor constructions. In order to achieve the soundness property, we still need to provide a knowledge proof to guarantee that the decryption and the test functions are consistent with each other (note that the scheme in [14] does not satisfy the third requirement in Definition 1). Moreover, it is also an interesting future work to improve this scheme to achieve IND-CCA security.
Proposed Scheme and its Soundness
In the proposed scheme, the intuition behind the Encrypt algorithm is that a message is protected by two layers of encryption (see the element c2). The first layer of encryption makes use of a hash value of the message and can only be removed by the receiver, while the second layer makes use of a hash value of the message and a bilinear pairing technique and it can only be removed with an appropriate messagedependent trapdoor or a master trapdoor. The search algorithms (Test1 and Test2) are made possible by employing the bilinear property of pairings.
• sKeyGen(λ): It generates a key pair (P Ks, SKs) for a standard PKE scheme (KeyGen ′ , Encrypt ′ , Decrypt ′ ), which has the message space M.
• rKeyGen(λ): It generates (P Kr, SKr) as follows.
1. Generate the pairing parameters: group G of prime order p, a bilinear mapê: G × G → GT , randomly chosen generators g1 and g2 of G.
2. Select a symmetric key encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) whose key space is M, and select three hash functions: H1 : GT → G, H2 : G → G, and H3 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ .
3. Select x1, x2 ∈R Zp and generate the receiver's key pair (P Kr, SKr) where P Kr = (g
2 ) and SKr = (x1, x2).
Besides P Kr, the pairing parameters (G, GT ,ê, p, g1, g2), symmetric key encryption scheme (Enc, Dec), and hash functions H1, H2, and H3 should be made public. The receiver's message space W is G.
• Encrypt(w, P Kr): It selects r1, r2 ∈R Zp and generates a ciphertext cw = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) as follows.
, H2(w) r 1 )).
• Decrypt(cw, SKr): It parses cw as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and computes w = , and outputs w if the following equalities hold. e(c1, H2(w)) =ê(g1, c4 c
If either equality does not hold, the algorithm outputs an error symbol ⊥.
• TrapGen 1 (w, P Ks, SKr): It selects y ∈R Zp and computes the message-dependent trapdoor tw,s = (v7, v8) as follows.
• Test1(c, tw,s, SKs): It performs as follows.
Parse c as (c
) and tw,s as (v7, v8). 2. Decrypt v8 to obtain k1 and decrypt v7 to recover v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5.
3. Output 1 if the following equalities hold, and output 0 otherwise.
• TrapGen 2 (P Ks, SKr): It generates a master trapdoor t * ,s = (u1, u2), where z ∈R Zp, k2 ∈R M,
, k2), u2 = Encrypt ′ (k2, P Ks).
• Test2(c, w, t * ,s, SKs): It performs as follows.
) and t * ,s as (u1, u2). 2. Decrypt u2 to obtain k2 and decrypt u1 to recover (x1, g z 1 , g
).
e(g1, c ′ 2
where α = c Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to show that the requirements in Definition 1 are satisfied.
Referring to the Encrypt algorithm, given a ciphertext cw = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) , it is straightforward to verify that the following equalities hold with probability 1.
Referring to the definition of the Decrypt algorithm, the above equalities means that Decrypt(cw, SKr) = w. As a result, the first requirement in Definition 1 is satisfied.
As to the second requirement, we prove two things.
• If Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds, we prove that the equality Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds. Let c = (c H1(ê(g
Based on these equalities and the definition of tw,s, we have the following.
e(v3, c (g
Based on the definition of Test1, we can conclude that Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds.
• If Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds, we prove that the equality Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds. Let c = (c
, we can re-write it in the following form.
2 , c
The equalities associated with labels (1) and (2) in the definition of Test1 lead to the following equalities.
1 , H2(w)
The first equality implies w † = 1, and the second equality implies that w * = w. Clearly, Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds.
As to the third requirement, we prove two things.
• If Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds, we prove that the equality Test2(c, w, t * ,s, SKs) = 1 holds. Let c = (c
). Based on these equalities associated with labels (6), (7), (8) and the definition of t * ,s, we have the following.
As a result, the equalities associated with labels (3), (4), and (5) in the definition of Test2 hold, we can conclude that Test2(c, w, t * ,s, SKs) = 1.
• If Test2(c, w, t * ,s, SKs) = 1, we prove that Decrypt(c, SKr) = w. Let c = (c
The equalities associated with labels (3), (4), and (5) in the definition of Test2 lead to the following equalities.
2 ), e(g1, H1(ê(g
1 , H2(w)),
The second equality implies that w * = w. Based on this fact, it is straightforward to verify that the first equality implies w † = 1. Based on the proof of the first requirement, it is clear that Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds.
All three conditions required by Definition 1 hold, the theorem follows.
Security Analysis
Let the pairing parameters param = (G, GT ,ê, p) be defined in the same way as in the rKeyGen algorithm. We briefly review the Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption [3] and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption [5] .
The DLIN assumption is as follows: any P.P.T. attacker adv can only distinguish T0 and T1 with a negligible advan- y , g z ) where x, y, z ∈R Zp and g is a generator of G, any P.P.T. attacker adv can only computeê(g, g)
x·y·z with a negligible probability.
In proving one of the theorems, we also use the assumption that inverting the bilinear mapê is hard, and this problem has been shown to be equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in G and GT [10, 15] . Certainly, this assumption is weaker than both DLIN and BDH assumptions. Proof. Under Definition 3, let Game0 be the attack game defined in Figure 2 . Let the attacker's advantage be ǫ0.
Next, consider a game Game1, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0, except for the following. For any TrapGen 2 query with the input P Ks, the challenger returns t * ,s = (u1, u2), generated as follows: select k Next, consider a game Game2, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game1, except for the following.
• At the beginning of the game, the challenger chooses y * ∈R Zp and constructs a list for the random oracle H2. If H2 is queried with input w, the challenger first checks the list. If there is already a hash value for w, the challenger returns this value; otherwise, the challenger chooses rw ∈R Zp and returns g rw 1 as the hash value, and then adds (w, g rw 1 , rw) to the list.
• For a TrapGen 1 query with input w and P Ks, the challenger generates the message-dependent trapdoor tw,s = (v7, v8) as follows.
yw ∈R Zp, v0 = g
In this game, let the attacker's advantage be ǫ2. Given that H2 is modeled as a random oracle, this game is identical to Game1 so that ǫ2 = ǫ1.
Next, consider a game Game3, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game2, except that the challenge cw b = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) is generated as follows.
In Game3, let the attacker's advantage be ǫ3. If H1 and H3 are modeled as random oracles, then Game3 differs from Game2 only ifê(g
1 , H2(w b ) r 1 ) has been queried to H1 or * ||ê(g
, H2(w) r 1 )|| * has been queried to H3 where the * can be anything. Based on the Difference lemma [11] and CLAIM 1 (stated and proven below), |ǫ3 − ǫ2| is negligible based on the BDH assumption.
Next, consider a new game Game4, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game3, except that the challenge cw b = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) is generated as follows.
Clearly, Game4 is identical to Game3. Let the attacker's advantage be ǫ4, so that we have ǫ4 = ǫ3. Based on its definition, ǫ4 can also be regarded as the attacker's advantage in distinguishing X0 and X1, where x1, x2, y * , r1, r2 ∈R Zp. Other public parameters (e.g. pairing parameters and w0, w1) are described in the game.
• X0 = (g1, g2, g
• X1 = (g1, g2, g
, g
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D1.
Reduction step 2a. D1 is equivalent to distinguish Y0 and Y1, where x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp and h1 ∈R G. Note that g x 1 ·y * 1 is set to be h1 and g x 1 1 is removed.
• Y0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D2.
Reduction step 2b. D2 can be reduced to distinguish Z0 and Z1, where x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G.
• Z0 = (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
2 )
• Z1 = (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D3.
Reduction step 2c. D3 is equivalent to distinguish U0 and U1, where x2, x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, δ ∈R G. Note that h2 is replaced by g • U0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D4.
Reduction step 2d. D4 is equivalent to distinguish V0 and V1, where α, x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G. Note that x2 is set to be α + x3.
• V0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D5.
Reduction step 2e. D5 can be reduced to distinguish W0 and W1, where x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G. The reduction is based on the fact that it is straightforward to construct a D5's instance from W0 and W1.
• W0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
2 , δ) Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D6.
Reduction step 2f. D6 can be reduced to the DLIN problem in G. The reduction is because from a DLIN instance we can construct a D6 instance as follows, where γ ∈R Zp.
•
Based on all above reductions, in Game4, the attacker's advantage ǫ4 is negligible based on the DLIN assumption. As a result, ǫ0 is negligible based on all the assumptions mentioned in the theorem. Proof. In Game3, besides the public parameters, the challenger only needs (g
) in order to answer the attacker's oracle queries. The computational problem (referred to as P1) is defined as follows.
• Input: (g1, g2, g
, where x1, x2, y * , r1, r2 ∈R Zp. Other public parameters are described in the game.
• Output:ê(g
The problem P1 can be equivalently rephrased as follows, referred to as P2. Note that g x 1 ·y * 1 is set to be h1 and H2(w b ) is set to be h2.
• Input: (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
2 ), where x1, x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1 ∈R G and h2 ∈R G.
The problem P2 can be reduced to the following problem (referred to as P3).
2 ), where x1, x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp.
The reduction is based on the fact that, from a P3's instance (g1, g2, g
2 ), we can construct a P2's instance (g1, g2, g
, g x 2 β+βγ−r 2 γ 2 ) for α, β, γ ∈R Zp. Furthermore, the problem P3 can be reduced to the following problem (referred to as P4).
• Input: (g2, g 2 ), where x1, x2, r2 ∈R Zp.
• Output:ê(g2, g2)
x 1 ·x 2 ·r 2 .
The reduction is based on the fact that, from a P4's instance (g2, g Proof. Under Definition 2, let Game0 be the attack game defined in Figure 1 . Let the attacker's advantage be ǫ0.
Next, consider a game Game1, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0, except for the following. For any TrapGen 1 query with the input w and P Ks, the challenger returns tw,s = (v7, v8), generated as follows: select v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, k1 uniformly at random from their corresponding domains, compute v7 = Enc(v0||v1||v2||v3||v4||v5, k1) and v8 = Encrypt ′ (k1, P Ks). In this game, let the attacker's advantage be ǫ1. Based on the IND-CPA definition for encryption schemes, |ǫ1 − ǫ0| is negligible if both (KeyGen ′ , Encrypt ′ , Decrypt ′ ) and (Enc, Dec) are IND-CPA secure. Next, consider a game Game2, where the challenger performs in the same way as in Game1, except for the following. For any TrapGen 2 query with the input P Ks, the challenger returns t * ,s = (u1, u2) which is generated as follows: select k Proof. Under Definition 7, according to the attack game definition in Figure 5 , the attacker can query sKeyReq t ′ for t ′ = 1 or t ′ = h. Without loss of generality, we assume that the attacker queries sKeyReq 1 . This means t = h, and the challenge tw b = (v7, v8) are defined as follows. Note the fact that revealing the receiver's private key x1, x2 will not affect the security of the encryption schemes, namely (KeyGen ′ , Encrypt ′ , Decrypt ′ ) and (Enc, Dec). Without oracle access to SKs h , the attacker can learn nothing about w b from tw b . Then, the theorem follows.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated the concept of ASE † † and attempted to provide a comprehensive security model for the primitive. As to the relationships of various security properties, the IND-CPA security against an outside attacker is implied by the ciphertext indistinguishability property against a Type-I server and the message-dependent trapdoor indistinguishability property (to be presented in the full paper due to space limit). Compared with previous works, such as those from [7, 8, 9] , our formulation defines more flexible functionalities and our security model reflects a higher level of security guarantees. The security of the proposed instantiation relies on the standard DLIN and BDH assumptions in the random oracle model, which plays an important role in the double encryption structure. It is an interesting future work to investigate an instantiation in the standard model, namely without using random oracle. With regard to trapdoor security, we have designed universal one-wayness property against all attackers. There is a possibility of replacing it with the augmented notion proposed in [2] or an even stronger notion similar to the ciphertext indistinguishability property against Type-II attacker in our security model. We consider this to be another line of future work.
